Protracted Displacement in Afghanistan Can Be Mitigated by a Change in Policy

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Protracted situations are often understood through the perspective of individuals who have been displaced for a long time, and interventions are designed with the view of facilitating an end to their displacement. But other structural factors contributing to long-term displacement, including the continuous generation of new and secondary displacements, should not be overlooked. Indeed, the prevention of new displacement and the provision of effective assistance to the recently displaced in order to prevent secondary displacements may represent the best hope for combating the complex problem of protracted displacement in Afghanistan.

Since 2002, European and North American governments have focused on increasing the returns of internally displaced people in a state of protracted displacement in Afghanistan. They have pushed for changes in land policies, the strengthening of the rule of law, and better social services ― all in the interest of the population as a whole and to facilitate the return of those who have been away from their places of origin for long periods of time.

This approach was rational because a high number of people wanted to return home and new displacements were few. However, the situation changed in 2005 when the number of returns of people in protracted displacement dropped significantly and the number of new conflict-induced displacements began to rise, stabilizing at over 100,000 per year. Between 2006 and 2010, on average, 400 Afghans were internally displaced daily, but only 18 returns of internally displaced people (IDP) were verified and assisted. ^[1]

At this juncture, a change in policy towards the reduction in the number of new displacements and support for returns for recently displaced people in conflict affected areas (when identification of IDPs is still practical) would have been desirable. However, not enough has been done. This is unfortunate given that changes which address people at risk of displacement and recently displaced people sometimes depend directly on European and North American governments’ actions through their military and civilian presence in the country. In contrast, most policies designed to facilitate the return or integration of people in protracted displacement in Afghanistan rely upon a change in Afghan policies, and the Afghan government’s capability to enforce its policies nationwide.

Moreover, the longer a person has been displaced in Afghanistan, the more difficult it is to find a durable solution to his or her displacement situation. ^[2] One reason for this is land grabbing and acquisitive prescription (acquiring property by continuous possession) as practiced by local authorities in Afghanistan, which makes it very difficult to reclaim property after many years of absence. Another reason is that social support networks in the IDPs (and refugees) place of origin tend to weaken over time.

This paper provides an overview of forced internal displacement since 2005 in the framework of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GP). ^[3] It suggests that IDPs face three critical moments during their displacement: at the very onset of their displacement, at the initial place of refuge and ― particularly for those who have been away for many years ― upon return to their places of origin. This paper argues that it is during the two first critical moments that US and European governments can improve their response in the short-term and achieve a quick positive impact on the protracted nature of displacement in Afghanistan.

Critical Moment 1: Risk of Forced Displacement

The most effective way of addressing continuous protracted displacement in Afghanistan is by reducing new displacements. This section examines the main causes of forced displacement and then discusses whether US and European states can contribute to mitigating them.

Causes of displacement

Armed conflict is currently the main cause of displacement in the south, east and west of Afghanistan. The US military and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in insurgent strongholds, including the “surge” have been big contributing factors of renewed displacement. ^[4] Some IDPs flee preventively, that is, to escape improvised explosive devices (IEDs), aerial bombardment, attacks and night raids. Others flee in order to escape various armed actors whose practices of intimidation and harassment include extortion, forced recruitment, and the feeding and caring for wounded combatants. Still others are unable to fend for themselves: their homes, fields and other productive assets have all been destroyed. ^[5]

Local and inter-ethnic disputes over land and water are also causes of displacement. The phenomenon was most visible in the central highlands, where clashes between nomadic Pashtun Kuchi and Hazara over grazing rights unleashed significant displacements during the summers of 2007, 2008 and 2010, mainly in Wardak and Bamyan provinces. ^[6]

But it is also evident in other parts of the country. There returning IDPs and refugees try to reclaim abandoned property, but find their land was either occupied by local warlords, their relatives or others, unwilling to honor the returnees’ claims. The strain on both formal courts as well as customary dispute-resolution mechanisms is often unbearable: some 20−30% of refugee returnees have been forced into secondary internal displacement over the past five years. ^[7]

Human rights abuses perpetrated by the Taliban have also caused large numbers of small-scale displacements, particularly in the southeast, south, and central regions. The Taliban intimidate, harass, and kill tribal elders, government officials, civilians working for international forces, teachers, health care workers, shopkeepers and the staff of Afghan and international NGOs. ^[8] They also target and displace members of minority Shi‘a groups. ^[9]

International actors’ role

National and international military operations could bring stability in the long-term and mitigate communal conflicts over resources while preventing Taliban human rights abuses. But it is far from clear that that has happened to date. In the Southern Region (SR), the Afghanistan Protection Cluster has observed that the impact of large scale military operations did not visibly enhance protection for civilians. ^[10]

On the contrary, most of the documented mass displacements occurred in the context of offensives by international forces in their struggle to curb a growing insurgency. ^[11] The UN Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs already drew attention to these practices by international and Afghan National Security Forces and the insurgency four years ago, and their disproportionate impact on civilians. These include intimidation and killings during night raids, air strikes on populated areas, location of military facilities in civilian areas and the failure to provide safe havens for civilians during combat, all of which drive displacement. ^[12]

The Brookings Institution (BI) and The Liaison Office (TLO) suggest that military planners integrate a deeper understanding of displacement into counterinsurgency strategies, guidelines and standard operating procedures. ^[13] Indeed, there are many aspects of military behavior requiring attention. ISAF do not always warn of imminent military action, for example. But that leaves civilians without escape routes. Roads are blocked as ISAF try to round up combatants, and civilians are justifiably afraid of fleeing through mined fields. ^[14] Unlawful evictions also occur. The Afghanistan Protection Cluster documented that in 2010 international military forces in Panjwai, Maiwand, and Zhari Districts of Kandahar Province damaged houses and fields as they built new roads around mined routes. ^[15]

Displacement caused by the recent use of local militias to counter Taliban advances in the north, both in areas where the insurgency is a serious threat and where the militias have control, are similarly troubling. They suggest that international and national pro-government forces (PGF) have yet to incorporate effective protection strategies into their military operations.

Critical Moment 2: Initial Stage of Displacement

Fifty per cent of Afghan IDPs flee within their province while the other half escape further afield. ^[16] But chronic insecurity during displacement combined with the absence of basic services means that many IDPs are forced into a secondary displacement, often to urban areas. Then they often end up in a state of protracted displacement. ^[17] Avoiding secondary displacement is thus critical to lessening the overall duration of the displacement experience. This can be done by helping recently displaced people cope in their initial place of refuge and providing them the means to either return or rebuild their lives elsewhere.

Access to basic necessities of life

Afghan IDPs who flee in response to an imminent or suspected threat have little time to prepare for the move, to sell their assets at market price or arrange for livelihoods and the education of their children. They are therefore often in need of assistance to satisfy the basic necessities of food, water, shelter and medical aid.

The rights to request and to receive protection and humanitarian assistance from national authorities are set out in Guiding Principles 3, 4, and 18. ^[18] The realization of these rights can enable IDPs to remain near their area or origin and increases their chances of successfully returning home.

Media and NGO reports however, reveal that the basic needs of recently displaced people across most regions of the country are often unmet. ^[19] One result is an increased risk of disease and death. Living conditions are often crowded, and immune systems are strained. Still, IDPs were among the groups with least access to basic health services in 2010. ^[20] This is because insecurity and the armed actors’ disregard for the sanctity of health facilities prevent IDPs from accessing health care, sometimes rendering curable conditions fatal. ^[21]

IDPs also are vulnerable to problems of food security. They have lost (or left behind) their livelihoods, have poor support networks and lack the skills needed to enter an already weak national labor market. ^[22] UNICEF observed in 2010 that displacement contributed to children's malnutrition in Kandahar province. It found that some children were starving in their homes because their parents were too scared to go out in search of food or otherwise unable to earn the money needed to feed them properly. ^[23]

The Afghan government is generally unable or unwilling to assist IDPs. It argues that such support might make the IDPs aid-dependent and encourage further displacements. ^[24] Instead hundreds of thousands IDPs have had their needs covered by international agencies. ^[25] But assistance to IDPs outside camps has been short-term and restricted by problems of funding and access, especially as a result of insurgent attacks on humanitarian workers and government employees in the health and education sectors. ^[26]

US and other ISAF countries’ use of private companies to deliver relief services to Afghans in order to win their support and the UN’s integrated approach, in which its political and humanitarian activities are not clearly separated, has, according to many analysts, made humanitarian work even more difficult. ^[27] This blurs a necessary distinction upon which humanitarians depend when seeking acceptance by all parties and trying to provide critical assistance to those in need.

Access to compensation

Many families are forced into displacement because they lack the means to rebuild a home destroyed in the armed conflict or replace lost livestock. But returns are often thwarted for the same reasons. Displaced families who cannot afford to rebuild damaged properties are less likely to move back to their villages of origin.

Compensation to IDPs for losses sustained during military operations could help the IDPs return home or integrate elsewhere. Indeed, the right to recover their property or receive compensation is safeguarded in Guiding Principle 29 and emphasized by the UN Special Representative for the human rights of IDPs after a visit to the country. ^[28]

An investigation by Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC) concludes that this right has been consistently violated in Afghanistan. ^[29] According to an agreement signed with the Afghan government, the US and other nations contributing troops to ISAF are not liable for damage to civilian property or civilian injury or death caused by their operations. According to CIVIC, US Special Operations Forces operating throughout Afghanistan do not compensate civilians, and regular US troops have only done so since 2005, though the amounts are minimal. German troops, Italian troops, and the Afghan national army all lack a policy or designated fund for compensation. ^[30]

Critical Moment 3: Return to Areas of Habitual Residence

When an IDP has overcome insecurity, discrimination and other obstacles brought about by their displacement, they can be said to have reached a “durable solution.” In Afghanistan, authorities and most IDPs prefer to pursue a durable solution through return to home areas. This section argues that returns for long-term IDPs is highly risky and can only be addressed in the long run.

Meanwhile, international forces need to exercise extreme caution when interacting with IDPs to ensure that opposition forces do not perceive the IDPs as parties to the military conflict. That is critical for facilitating a durable solution for both long-term and recently displaced people.

Risk related to local competition over resources

Returns can be dangerous times for IDPs unless they are voluntary, safe, informed and in conditions of dignity. For Afghan IDPs who have been away for many years and who try to recover abandoned properties, return situations are often disastrous and not unlike the circumstances which triggered their displacement in the first place.

Much of the problem has to do with the mechanisms established for resolving disputes over land. Ownership of land and property is regulated by a complex mixture of statutory, religious and customary law. The courts often cannot be relied upon to resolve disputes fairly ― the result of a lack of resources, adequate legaltraining, and widespread corruption. Therefore, customary mechanisms (jirgas, shuras) are often more popular among the people. These are seen as favoring compromise and being fast and inexpensive. But they too often favor the powerful over the powerless, older men over younger men and women, ^[31] and their regulating authority has been eroded through conflict and displacement. The influxes of large groups have exacerbated the competition over resources, and militants have to some extent replaced traditional leaders trained to uphold customary law. This means that despite the important role of traditional leaders and customary law in Afghan society, customary procedures today often lead to decisions that fail to respect both communal desires for reconciliation (and also international human rights).

The deterioration in the integrity of customary law and procedures has in turn increased tensions around the returns of refugees and IDPs who have been away for several years. And those tensions have become a primary preoccupation of the Afghan population. According to the 2007/2008 national risk and vulnerability assessment, the general population in some rural areas of the country cited the return process as their most negative recent experience. Nationwide, 60 percent of respondents said that increased competition over scarce resources meant the influx of IDPs and returnees had affected them negatively. ^[32] This tension, not well managed in several regions, especially the east and north, has become a source of violent conflict and (secondary) displacement.

Risk related to military involvement

Civilians face real risks when military forces are directly involved in humanitarian assistance and when they are perceived by one actor to support another.

Upon their return to their places of origin, many IDPs remain fearful. They are afraid of continued fighting, roadside bombs and Taliban abuses against those who accept aid or jobs from the government or ISAF. ^[33] In the aftermath of Operation Moshtarak (which took place in Helmand in early 2010), IDPs who initially returned and received aid and employment opportunities from PGF were later threatened by the Taliban and forced them into secondary displacement.

In addition, ill or wounded Afghans who go to an ISAF-run clinic or receive assistance from organisations affiliated with the US/ISAF counterinsurgency strategy risk retaliation from the opposition, be they Taliban or other militant groups. But this dynamic is not limited to one side. Those who turn to the opposition for assistance face similar risks, only at the hands of international and Afghan forces. The inherent contradiction built into military forces’ provision of humanitarian assistance is thus causing many problems in Afghanistan and should be reexamined.

Responding to Critical Moments

Afghan government officials claim that IDPs in Afghanistan are economic migrants drawn to the cities by poverty and the promise of subsidies and services. But it is clear that the consistently high rates of displacement in Afghanistan since 2006 are due to objectively verifiable factors intimately linked to the armed conflict and human rights abuses. As such, those displaced should be entitled to state protection.

Protection of IDP is both a security and a humanitarian challenge. The risk of human rights violations are clearly heightened during displacement, particularly for impoverished IDPs, women and children. Meanwhile, as observed by analysts, IDPs who are not protected by national authorities seek protection from those who can and will provide protection, sometimes warlords and insurgent groups. ^[34]

The best way of addressing these and other challenges which contribute to the protractedness of displacement in Afghanistan is by changing policies that affect the initial phases of displacement. Rather than attacking the barriers suffered by long-term IDPs through changes in national legislation or in local (customary) practices, international cooperation should explore ways of preventing IDPs from becoming displaced for months or years to begin with.

The most important contribution that US and European states can make is to minimise new displacements caused by US and ISAF forces. This can be achieved through the adoption of standard operating procedures that oblige troops to take concrete action to protect civilians and their needs before, during and after military activities, and by the development of monitoring and reporting mechanisms on forced internal displacement.

ISAF made successful efforts in 2010 to spare the civilian population. ^[35] However, the same efforts are not made to reduce forced internal displacement, despite the scale of the problem, international legal obligations to do so, and studies showing that the phenomenon has a damaging effect on ISAF’s acceptance and support. ^[36] According to IDMC reviews of the “Afghanistan war logs” and interviews with journalists who had access to the 80,000 reports ― covering an area and time which coincided with more than half a million internal displacements ― as well as the US embassy cables leaked by WikiLeaks, there was not one mention of displacement in Afghanistan in either batch of documents. ^[37]

Direct actions by US and ISAF forces are not the only problem. A review of their alliances with local warlords and militia commanders, who in part fund their activities through extortion and land grabbing and who are themselves responsible for displacements, must also be carried out.

A second contribution US and European countries can make is to ensure independent assessments of damage to IDPs’ property and compensate those whose losses result from operations by national and international forces.

CIVIC and other organizations have lobbied consistently on the issue of compensation. As a result, NATO’s North Atlantic Council approved in June 2010 non-binding guidelines on compensation for loss of life, injury and destruction of property. But the guidelines have yet to render tangible results. ^[38] A coordinated approach for the provision of recognition and redress including clear and practical procedures for recording casualties, receiving claims, conducting investigations and offering amends is required. International forces should examine exactly how they can make these guidelines operational in the field not only for their own troops but also, in agreement with the government, for the Afghan National Security Forces.

Given the difficulties faced by IDPs who have been in direct contact with pro-government forces and those forces’ limited ability to undertake investigations on the ground, the option of strengthening an independent civilian entity charged with investigating damage and determining adequate compensations should be considered.

USAID is currently funding a separate scheme ― the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)'s Afghan civilian assistance program. But this program, designed to support those who suffer losses as a result of military operations against insurgents, has encountered problems. An audit in late 2009 showed that the programme faced barriers in accessing the affected population and that only 780 families had received assistance.

A third important contribution US and European countries can make is to persuade the Afghan government to give a higher priority to the protection and assistance of IDPs, and to provide the conditions and resources necessary for humanitarian organisations to operate efficiently in all rural areas.

The GoA’s protection and assistance to conflict-induced IDPs is coordinated by the Ministry of Refugees and Returnees (MoRR). With UNHCR’s advice, the government has developed policies to address protracted displacement such as the national return, displacement and reintegration strategy which was adopted in 2003 with the aim of facilitating a durable solution for IDPs displaced before 2002.

But the GoA has not yet developed legal instruments to prevent and respond to internal displacement and ensure that the human rights of IDPs are fully respected. (This is despite the fact that the Afghanistan national development strategy (ANDS) provides a basic framework in which to do so. ^[39] ) For example, it does not provide a definition for an IDP in Afghanistan, nor prohibit discrimination against them ― a core tenet of the Guiding Principles. And it does not address the right to a durable solution for those unable or unwilling to return home. ^[40]

Moreover, despite efforts by the UNHCR to strengthen the MoRR, the latter remains weak. The MoRR has limited leverage with other national ministries, and it has failed to ensure that IDPs’ protection is mainstreamed into national development programmes. According to the national budget, only US$3 million was allocated during the fiscal year 2009–2010 to providing assistance to refugees and IDPs who wanted to return. ^[41] The MoRR, the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development (MRRD) and other ministries which are responsible for an IDP response require additional financial support so they can meet their obligations through activities in the field.

North American and European governments should persuade the government of Afghanistan to assume their responsibility in developing comprehensive IDP legislation and polices to better respond to people who have been displaced since 2005. The Brookings Project on Internal Displacement and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) finalised a review of Afghan laws and policies in 2010, based on national responsibility benchmarks. Entitled “Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility,” the document provides an excellent guideline for doing just that. ^[42]

Most pressing is ensuring the requisite conditions so that humanitarian actors can operate efficiently in the entirety of Afghan territory. UN humanitarian agencies have been targeted as military objectives by insurgent groups because of UN’s political commitment to Afghanistan as a nation. While the UN’s political role in Afghanistsan is clearly important and necessary, the independence of its humanitarian agencies must also be safeguarded.

The blurring between the political and the humanition has indeed had serious consequences. Lacking the distinction, UN agencies and many NGOs have been forced to withdraw from the conflict hotspots where they are most needed, forcing international organizations to operate through local partners. This in turn makes effective delivery of services and monitoring of those efforts significantly more complicated. Under the circumstances, information gathering has also become extremely difficult.

A commitment to the humanitarian needs of the displaced population thus requires that North American and European countries re-examine their multilateral approach in Afghanistan and ensure that funding for humanitarian activities is channelled through independent humanitarian actors. That entails a political decision. And thus far those countries have been reluctant to act on it.

A fourth important contribution US and European countries can make is to ensure that returns are safe, voluntary and in conditions of human dignity. For recently displaced people, this can be done by reducing their involvement with international and national (military) forces.

Faced with a dysfunctional judiciary and a customary system which is eroding, international donors and the Afghan government have tried several initiatives without significantly improving the prospect for IDPs’ durable returns. Presidential Decree 104 of 2005 also launched a national land allocation program to assign public land to landless returning refugees and IDPs. But its reach has been limited and its implementation inconsistent, especially as they pertain to the Kuchi and IDPs displaced outside their province of origin and unable to return. ^[43] A land titling and economic restructuring project supported by USAID recently improved the security of tenure by formalizing more than 53,000 property claims, digitalizing 610,000 property documents and facilitating adoption of a national land policy. But the impact of this project and an ongoing national land reform initiative are unknown. ^[44]

Indeed, it is difficult to see how international actors can influence local authorities to make more and better decisions for returning IDPs without buying land for the returnees. The fundamental issues are too hard to address in the midst of an intensifying armed conflict to which the international community is party. The difficult issues include the implementation of a land reform program in collaboration with de facto customary authorities. They have to do with reducing the essential causes of displacement, such as the armed conflict and tribal disputes over resources, and helping to provide alternative and sustainable livelihoods to a significant percentage of rural IDPs.

What North American and European states can do is ensure that internally displaced people will not be associated or implicated with the military efforts of their forces. This will protect returning IDPs from future targeting by armed opposition groups.

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