BEST PRACTICES

Providing Fair Protection Processes and Documentation for Internally Displaced and Host Communities: The Experience of the Protection and Assistance Centers (PACs) in Southern Iraq

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INTRODUCTION

The Protection and Assistance Centers (PACs) were launched in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq with the aim of providing legal and material assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs). Three international non-governmental organizations in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have been in charge of managing them.

This paper aims to shed light on the experience of five PACs in southern Iraq which have been managed by INTERSOS from 2004 through 2011. ^[1] As will be shown, the two main distinctive ingredients that enabled the success of the project were the outreach mechanism to cope with urban settings and the holistic approach adopted to target the beneficiaries based on their vulnerabilities rather than by the rigid definition of their status.

CONTEXT: INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN AFTER 2003

As of December 2010, the total number of IDPs in Iraq was estimated to be 1,552,003. In 2010, a total of 92,480 IDPs and 26,410 refugees returned to their various areas of origin/return in Iraq. ^[2]

While current returns have been dominated by IDPs, it is important to note that IDP returns often precede refugee returns. IDPs are located closer to their areas of origin, have higher mobility, and a greater opportunity to visit or obtain information about the security situation and condition of their homes. The vast majority of IDPs residing in southern Iraq originated from Baghdad Governorate, whilst the majority of refugee returnees residing in the south came back from Iran in the aftermath of 2003.

Country-wide, the intentions of the displaced may vary considerably between return, resettlement and local integration. However, the preferred solution, particularly in the South, most notably in Thi Qar and Basrah, is local integration. ^[3]

Internally displaced Iraqis largely reside in urban peripheries and rural areas. Moreover, since the ban on tents and camps was imposed by the Government of Iraq (GoI), an increasing number of displaced persons have started dwelling in self-made “settlements” or already present collective settlements known as “complexes.”

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remains the largest organization providing assistance to internally displaced Iraqis, especially through partnerships with local and international non-governmental organization, most notably in the delivery of non-food items and in the provision of legal assistance to many families of concern.

The Ministry of Migration and Displacement (MoDM), which until 2008 had yet to acquire full ministerial status and still operated under the Ministry of the Interior, has become the main institutional counterpart in addressing internal displacement.

Since its inception, MoDM has been in charge of registering post-2006 IDPs and both IDP and refugee returnees. ^[4] Returnees are entitled to a number of benefits from MoDM that aim at incentivizing their return. They are entitled to rent or purchase property, vote, obtain land title, and access services specific to IDPs. ^[5] Non-registered IDPs may find it difficult to access to these services. Those IDPs who had been displaced prior to February 2006 are not entitled to be registered with MoDM. Moreover, beginning in 2009, IDP registration at the governorate level was restricted and eventually stopped. ^[6]

After the fall of the Ba’thist regime, displacement resulted in the loss or destruction of personal documentation and registries. Lack of documentation and other means to prove one’s identity have had serious consequences for individuals and communities, including restricted freedom of movement, limited access to life-saving assistance and services, exposure to harassment or arbitrary arrest and detention, and the risk of statelessness.

On the other hand, legislation and civil documentation were subject to considerable changes in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the subsequent formation of a new government led to the issuance of new identification cards, nationality cards, marriage and birth certificates, and other essential documents needed to exercise civil and political rights as well as socio-economic and cultural rights.

It is in this context that PACs were born in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion in partnership with UNHCR to address the legal needs of internally displaced and returnee Iraqis. Following the bombings of the Al Askari mosque in Samarra in February 2006, INTERSOS was running a total of 6 PACs. ^[7] The overall operational goal of the project was to provide adequate humanitarian assistance and protection to IDPs, returnees, refugees, stateless, and host communities in southern Iraq through the provision of protection-oriented and material assistance. This goal was divided into the following rights groups and corresponding objectives:

• Fair protection processes and documentation for IDPs and returnees and local communities, primarily through the strengthening of civil status documentation;
• Improvement of the basic needs and essential services of IDPs and returnees through the warehousing of sufficient basic domestic and hygiene items for distribution by local NGOs to the vulnerable communities in southern Iraq;

This paper will discuss the first above-mentioned objective. As explained below, this objective was achieved through a holistic approach which flexibly targeted both the displaced and the host communities, and an efficient outreach tool which extended the presence of the PACs to the particular urban and rural settings where the beneficiaries resided.

TARGETING BENEFICIARIES: A HOLISTIC APPROACH

In 2010, INTERSOS PACs assisted 10,882 legal beneficiaries: 1,243 old IDPs, 4,875 newly IDPs, 2,649 refugee returnees, 16 refugee returnees into displacement, 2,056 vulnerable local community members, and 43 IDP returnees.

The number of PoCs assisted by INTERSOS PACs since their inception has steadily grown, reaching 24.6% of the targeted population in 2010. The demographic composition of this population is represented in Chart 1 below.

The majority of beneficiaries were IDPs. However, recognizing the importance of also providing assistance to other UNHCR’s PoCs, including members of the host communities, INTERSOS adopted a more holistic approach to identifying beneficiaries, based on their vulnerability as well as their category.

The decision to provide legal protection both to persons of concern and to a significant proportion of vulnerable host communities was also dictated by the risk of triggering friction between the host and displaced communities, as well by the risks associated with emphasizing internal displacement, which could result in the stigmatization of this group, if not in an element of negative discrimination.

The creation of an “IDP card” based on IDP status has been an expedient for addressing emergency needs, but it also has created a rigid legal category that arbitrarily excluded other de facto IDPs in need of assistance ― most notably, those displaced before 2006 as well as persons displaced by the drought and forced into secondary displacement for a variety of reasons.

To address these challenges, in 2010 alone the PACs assisted 2,056 vulnerable host community members (amounting to almost 19% of the total target population) as well as a number of Iraqis who were displaced prior to the 2006 events (see chart above). This approach facilitated the achievement of the objective of providing fair protection processes, based on the vulnerabilities of the beneficiaries.

Moreover, in order to respect the 20% threshold of vulnerable host community beneficiaries agreed with UNHCR, the PACs established a solid referral mechanism with other civil society organization involved in addressing the needs of such category: during 2010, INTERSOS PACs referred 2,894 legal cases to other stakeholders, whilst the number of cases referred from other stakeholders to the PACs totalled 1,040.

The PACs faced considerable obstacles in seeking to achieve the legal cases of these beneficiaries. ^[8] Whereas referral to other PACs in the country was not possible, the PoCs had either to renounce to return or go back to the hot areas whilst putting at risk their physical safety. In order to cope with this challenge, the PAC established and consolidated a smooth referral mechanism with the PACs and RICCs working in the place of origin of the displaced. On the other hand, referral from the southern areas of responsibility to the countries of asylum was not equally successful. Bureaucracy was a major obstacle in the issuance of new passports to Iraqis residing in countries of asylum, particularly because certain countries required new passports from Iraqi nationals (known at type “G”) in order to enter their territories. On the other hand applicants had to apply in person in order to record biometric data (finger thumbs). ^[9]

Geographical consistency in the enforcement of the relevant legislation represents a major obstacle for the PACs. In particular, as provided by internal instructions issued by the Governmental Council in 2007 in Diwaniya, IDPs were prevented from entering this province and transfer their food ration cards unless the beneficiary civil record is already present in Diwaniya. In addition the persons subject to this decision must provide evidence from the tribe leader proving that they are not involved in any terrorist or armed groups and this evidence is difficult to obtain as the beneficiary must travel to his former place of residence in the hot areas.

In addition, in order to register IDPs, MoDM branch offices should rely on ID documentation as provided by MoDM Baghdad and not just on PDS cards, as was often the case. IDPs should actually be included and benefit from the services of the Social Protection Net. Moreover, relevant provisions on the postponement of the evictions should be enforced at the local level.

Lack of coordination and communication between the central and the local level is a major obstacle in the application of the relevant regulations. Advocacy at the central level may provide with a good tool to cope with the lack of the enforcement of the relevant legislation.

PROVIDING PROTECTION IN RURAL AND URBAN SETTINGS

The main distinctive feature of the PACs was outreach. This was ensured through the deployment of mobile team visits in the urban and rural setting whereas persons of concern reside. The role of mobile teams was two folded: on the one hand it served to conduct protection monitoring, on the other hand it served to follow up on the identified cases including through legal remedies, alternative customary channels and referral.
Protection Monitoring aims at identifying protection concerns, risk and vulnerability needed to inform a protective action and strategy. Protection Monitoring constituted an activity to produce information that needs to be acted upon, particularly when it refers to specific violations of rights (i.e. referral of SGBV identified cases to services providers). ^[10]
The PACs periodically monitored the locations based on quarterly work-plans, drawn from the following criteria:

• Large concentrations of PoCs
• Persons at risk of displacement (such as ethnic or religious minorities)
• Settlements/Complexes (which include any type of illegal squatting)
• Potential locations of return
• Follow-up visits for the above-mentioned reasons

The locations identified were monitored cyclically. This allowed the monitoring of long-term changes and developments with a view toward durable solutions. The PACs tried to adhere strictly to the work-plan, but a certain degree of flexibility was applied to cope with unexpected arrivals of IDPs or returnees, sudden and grave violations such as evictions and deportations, as well as security concerns.

Information about the locations and assistance provided by the PACs was delivered at the Iraqi border. Between 2008 and 2009, the PACs expanded their activities to monitor the border with Iran in close coordination with the RICCs and UNHCR, most notably through the border crossing points of Shalamamcheh and Mehran. The PACs monitored the willingness of the refugees to repatriate, and provided them with material and legal assistance. Returnees included Faili Kurds and Arabs. The majority of returnees came from Ahwaz and Azan camp. In 2007, the Basrah PAC alone provided legal and logistical assistance to 116 refugee returnees through Shelamicha border.

Since 2009 INTERSOS focused on complexes of IDPs. These particular settings became a priority in the first half of 2010 since they are estimated to be home to 500,000 individuals country-wide. ^[11] In the South, the PACs estimated their presence at roughly 30,000 individuals, including approximately 50% persons of concern. ^[12]

Throughout the monitoring INTERSOS managed to postpone and find alternative solution for several persons squatting in the settlements.

Close and regular coordination with Basrah and Nassiriyah RICCs served to ensure maximum impact and avoid overlapping of the activities.

Through the mobile team visits, the PACs managed to gain the trust of both host and displaced communities, which in turn allowed persons of concern to contact the Center or directly approach the premises. In 2010, INTERSOS PACs received 4,128 beneficiaries at the Centers and 6,754 through the outreach visits of mobile teams.

KEY FACTORS OF PROJECT SUCCESS AND PREREQUISITES FOR REPLICATION

To phase out, in 2011 the southern PACs were handed over to NNGOs, whilst transfer of the most experienced staff was ensured through the active role of UNHCR. On the one hand, this was part of an exit strategy to involve local civil society organizations whose capacity had been built. On the other, it served to alleviate the costs and mitigate the risks of displacement “ending” when funding ends.

In large part, the success of the project has been achieved thanks to the commitment of the local staff, whose capacity has been built throughout the many years of activities. By way of contrast, expatriate staff was limited in its movement by security constraints. Although remote management represented a major obstacle in the implementation of activities, the presence of solidly skilled staff in the field mitigated the risks implied in this form of management.

Participation at the beneficiary level was also of paramount importance. Thus, replication should be based on the assumption that the displaced actually understand the importance of the service provided. This may not be easily achieved, particularly in the first phase of an emergency, whereas legal protection may be perceived as of minor importance in respect to other sectors of intervention. Replication to other protracted refugee situation settings would require a large margin of flexibility, taking into consideration a number of factors around which the concept should be re-tailored.

The use of documentation varies widely from country to country, as do the consequences of not possessing them. In many contexts, however, IDPs’ access to benefits and legal rights are contingent on the production of documents such as identification cards, passports, birth and marriage certificates, educational diplomas, and certification of health and welfare rights or property title. Replication would only make sense in a context where inadequate procedures to provide or renew missing or invalid documents for displaced persons can lead to violations of their rights.

Coordination with UNHCR must be established from the outset. The UNHCR was not only the key partner through the project cycle but played an essential role in coordinating efforts countrywide.

In order to avoid the prevalence of tribal law, or other forms of informal customary law, the statutory law needs to be relatively solid and well established.
The attention of the donor community witnessed considerable changes since the 2003 invasion. ^[13] The US Government has been the single biggest contributor of humanitarian assistance to displaced Iraqis since 2003, but its contribution was not exempt from considerable cut-off. Similarly, the contribution of the GoI has been significantly dwindling. ^[14]

Whilst funding may be subject to change, the protracted nature of the Iraqi displacement may be hardly addressed, thus posing significant challenges to the implementation of the activities and to the progressive achievement of durable solutions. In order to prevent financial resources from dictating who is considered an IDP, with displacement “ending” when funding does, stable assistance from donors is of paramount importance.

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